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Anselmian Explorations, the difference being that—in comparison with
Morris’s volume—the technical machinery utilized to assess various Anselmian claims is considerably enlarged and sophisticated. Almeida’s presentation is often couched in the symbolism of quantified modal logic, and
interacts with an impressively large swath of published material on divine
freedom, the problem of evil, divine command theory, and related topics.
Although he follows in a long line of philosophers of religion who have
devoted attention to the coherence of theism, the author’s unique contribution in this volume is to (i) assess the divine attributes in “unfamiliar
contexts” generated by recent philosophical advances, (ii) argue that these
contexts reveal surprising implications of the Anselmian “package” of divine attributes, and thereby (iii) make a sustained case that many recent
dilemmas posed for Anselmianism lack cogency. His thesis about “metaphysically occluded facts” should be of great interest to practitioners of
philosophical theology, who are often asked (or ask others) to take a fairly
permissive stance on the ability of a priori intuition alone to reach reliable
judgments about metaphysical matters.

Anselm on Freedom, by Katherin Rogers. New York: Oxford University
Press, 2008. Pp. 217.
HUGH J. MCCANN, Texas A&M University
The thesis of this book is that in his writings on free will, Anselm attempts
the first systematic libertarian analysis of freedom. The author develops
her thesis in significant part by contrasting Anselm’s position with that of
Augustine, whose views on the subject lay at the center of Anselm’s own
theological heritage. Her strongest focus is on what Anselm has to say in
De Casu Diaboli about the fall of the angels, but ample attention is paid to
his other writings as well, and frequent use is made of concepts developed
by contemporary writers on free will.
The book’s Introduction characterizes libertarianism as involving two
key principles: that a libertarian free choice cannot be determined, causally
or otherwise, by anything outside the agent’s own choosing; and that such
a choice must ultimately originate in, or be caused by, the agent himself (5).
This leads directly to the problem that is the book’s central focus. Classical
theism, which Rogers describes in chapter 1, held it as a non-negotiable
principle that as creator, God is the cause of all that is not God. Anything
having positive ontological status either is God or comes from God, who
sustains all things in being throughout their existence (16). The problem is
to reconcile this with libertarian freedom, which would appear to exclude
such a role for God when it comes to human choices. We are told in chapter
2 that Augustine’s solution to this problem is to adopt compatibilism—a
position, says Rogers, that he maintained throughout his career. To uphold
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compatibilism is, however, insufficient. It yields a version of freedom that
allows God complete sovereignty as primary cause; but it makes God the
cause of all human choices, including sinful ones (42). And God cannot be
the author of sin.
A defender of Augustine might at this point invoke his famous doctrine
that evil consists not in anything that has positive being but in some deficiency, in the absence of something that ought to be present. Applied to the
sinful will, this would mean that the evil of a wrong choice has to consist
not in being but in nonbeing, in the absence of something that ought to be
there. It is obvious that what does not exist has no cause, hence we ought
to be able to say that although, in their positive aspects, God is the cause
of acts that are sinful, neither he nor anything else is the cause of them
qua sin, inasmuch as their sinfulness can have no cause. But while Rogers
devotes a fair amount of attention to answers of this kind, she considers
them insufficient (46–51). At bottom, her reason seems rooted in Augustine’s determinism, which permits God to be considered the “deficient
cause” of sin in that he does not provide the causal influence that, in the
case of agents who maintain a just will, enables them to choose justly. The
most important case in point is that of the good and bad angels. The good
were able to persevere in their goodness and achieve eternal bliss because
God’s grace ensured that they would do so; the evil did not receive sufficient grace and fell as a result—which leaves Augustine’s position open
to the charge that responsibility for the original evil lies with God (50–51).
For Rogers the only solution to this problem is to adopt a libertarian
view, which she sees Anselm as doing. For Anselm, it is logically impossible for God to cause a creature to sin, in essence because to do so would
be for him to will that the creature disobey his will, which is a selfcontradiction (19, 89). From this impossibility Rogers draws the conclusion that, “The choice to sin must arise from within the created agent himself” (19). This choice is to be understood in libertarian terms; indeed, for
Rogers the capacity for free choice amounts to a kind of aseity, a sort of
sharing in God’s capacity for primary causation. The point is developed
by way of a citation she gives from Cur Deus Homo (II, 10) concerning the
praiseworthiness of the good angels: “Those angels are not to be praised
for their justice due to the fact that they were able to sin, but rather due
to the fact that, in a way, they have it from themselves [Rogers’s italics] that
they are [now] unable to sin; in this they are, to some extent, similar to God,
who has whatever he has from himself (a se).” Rogers then states that the
crucial requirement for freedom and praiseworthiness is not open options
but aseity. She goes on to say that contrary to Augustine, Anselm “embraces
the view that the created agent imitates God in being a genuine cause, what
I have called a primary agent. Though all that happens is permitted by
God, there are some events in this universe not causally willed by God, but
rather willed by, and originating from, the created agent” (59).
How this works out in practice is told in chapters 3 through 6, in which
Rogers develops an account of Anselm’s treatment of freedom, often with
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the aid of concepts drawn from contemporary discussions. Among the
main points are, first, that Anselm does not in fact define freedom as the
ability to choose between good and evil. This is because neither God nor
the good angels in their present state are able to choose evil, yet both are
to be considered free. Rather, freedom of choice is to be understood as
the power for preserving rightness of will for its own sake (63), where
rightness of will consists essentially in an agent desiring what it ought to
desire. But while freedom of choice does not, for Anselm, demand a context of alternative possibilities, it is necessary that it be exercised in such
a context by the angels in their primordial state, and similarly for human
agents in the prelapsarian setting. Sticking with the case of the angels,
God provides their wills with two affectiones or desires. One is a desire for
benefit, that is, for what leads to happiness; the other is a desire for justice,
which Rogers takes as a second order desire on the Frankfurt model, a
desire that one’s desires for benefit be ordered as they ought to be (67).
As long as this order is preserved, justice is maintained. In the primordial
angels, however, a conflict arises between a desire for justice and an inordinate desire for benefit. It is in the resolution of this conflict that the fate
of each angel is settled.
But just why does the case of the angels require alternative possibilities,
and how exactly is the conflict between them resolved? The answer to the
first question is that alternatives are necessary in order that the angel have
or lack justice through a choice that is from himself—that is, according to
Rogers, by a self-caused choice (73). Had the angel received only one affectio from God, even if it were the desire for justice, it would deserve no
reward from God because it would have acted out of necessity, owing to
its received nature. Having both affectiones makes it possible for the angel
to act from itself or on its own (sponte), and thus to be deserving of its fate.
As to how the conflict is resolved, one might expect there to be some positive act of decision or choice by which the angel either ratifies the just state
in which it is created, or turns away from justice to pursue benefit. In fact,
however, Rogers does not read Anselm this way—perhaps in part because
she sees no clear distinction in his writings between choice and occurrent
desire, but perhaps also because like Augustine, Anselm subscribes to the
non-negotiable thesis that everything possessing positive being is caused
by God. In any case, Rogers holds that for Anselm, neither in maintaining
justice nor in sinning does the agent add anything to the sum of things:
In the struggle between the desires for justice and for inappropriate
benefit, the ultimate choice is not some third element, a really existing
“something” above and beyond the desires. It is either a just choice, which
is a continuation of the harmony of . . . motives . . . with which the agent
was created, or else an unjust choice, which is the “winning out” of the
already existing desire for the wrong benefit. Nothing with any ontological status is brought into being by the created agent. However, it is up to
the agent himself whether he will maintain the just status quo, or pursue
the wrong benefit (118).
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Chapter 7 is devoted to a similar account of original sin, and Anselm’s
view of the relation between grace and freedom in the postlapsarian will.
Chapters 8 and 9 are devoted to Anselm’s views on foreknowledge and
freedom. Anselm is seen to reject fatalism, on the ground that the relation between God’s knowledge of our actions and the deeds themselves
is one only of conditional or consequent necessity; and Anselm’s view of
divine eternity is argued to require a four-dimensionalist view of time
rather than a presentist reading. An important point is that because of the
freedom it provides to creatures, Anselm’s view implies that God is unable to control what our choices will be. Furthermore, it entails that we are
able to act upon God, in that he can learn what we choose only from the
choices themselves. Thus our freedom requires a loss both of sovereignty
and impassivity on God’s part. The loss is, however, diminished by the
fact that it is self-imposed (151). Chapter 10 is devoted to God’s own freedom, including his options as to what worlds he might create.
There is a great deal in this book to discuss, but I cannot help but express a serious misgiving about its main thesis. God’s aseity may fairly be
expressed by saying that God and all his attributes have their existence
from his own nature. It is understandable, therefore, that one might take
Anselm’s statements that the good and bad angels have their moral status
“of themselves” as signifying a special sort of reflection of the divine nature,
one in which each angel, and indeed any other agent acting with genuine
moral freedom, confers existence on its own choices. There is, however, no
place where Anselm says created agents ever exercise anything that can
count as primary agency; and the conclusion Rogers rightly draws from
the possibility—namely, that for creatures to exercise such agency would
effectively be for them to operate causally upon God—flies directly in the
face of Anselm’s repeated claims in Proslogion and in Cur Deus Homo that
God is impassible.1 Worse, if one looks into Rogers’s account of Anselm for
a way in which this so-called primary causality is exercised, one gets no
help. True, we are told in the passage cited above that it is up to the agent
whether he will maintain the just status quo or pursue wrongful benefit.
But far from being offered a means by which this option is exercised, we are
instead told that the agent brings into being nothing that has ontological
status. That is not the way choice works. Whatever my powers of agency
amount to, if I am poised between two options I must act if I am to settle
between them. That act, the act of choosing, can only be an event with positive ontological status, which by Anselm’s lights requires that it owes its
existence to God alone.
I think, then, that Anselm’s claims about rational agents having their
justice and injustice of themselves require a weaker reading. Very likely,
he means something like this: that our moral choices manifest each of our
individual personalities, and are intrinsically such as to be deserving of
1
Anselm, Basic Writings, ed. and trans. Thomas Williams (Indianapolis, Ind.: Hackett Publishing Co., 2007), 84, 85, 88, 253.
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praise or blame. This is not to suggest that no trace of what contemporary
writers think of as libertarianism is to be found in Anselm. There is, for
example, very little in his writings of the distinctively compatibilist theme
Rogers finds rife in Augustine, that our choices always follow our strongest desire. Perhaps, then, Anselm inclined to something like present day
libertarianism when it comes to worldly causes. But it is difficult to believe
he took creaturely freedom as in any way diminishing God’s role as primary cause, or his complete sovereignty over all creation.
One could also express misgivings over Rogers’s determination to read
Anselm as much as possible in terms of contemporary concepts having
to do with freedom. I am disposed to think, however, that therein lies the
book’s greatest contribution. It is difficult to retrofit contemporary ideas
to those of the past, and I would not claim that Rogers’s effort to do so
always succeeds. In the long run, however, the enterprise of studying past
thought against the backdrop of contemporary views can only increase
our understanding of both, and Rogers’s treatment of Anselm on freedom
greatly advances that endeavor.

Living Forms of the Imagination, by Douglas Hedley. London and New York:
T & T Clark, 2008. Pp. x + 308. ISBN 978056702959 (paper).
PAUL J. GRIFFITHS, Duke Divinity School
“Dichterisch wohnet der Mensch”—we live poetically. Heidegger wrote
this, and Douglas Hedley quotes it with full approval as an aphoristic
summary of the central position of this delightful and often beautiful
book. That position is, to make a complicated matter too simple, that it is
proper to human beings to make a constant imaginative contribution to
the bounds and structure of the world we inhabit, thus forging the world’s
given elements into a whole that is neither fanciful or fictional, but instead
(when things go well) profoundly realistic, resonant with, and responsive
to the most fundamental order of things. Imagination, for Hedley, is cognitively indispensable as well as affectively essential: without it, it is not
possible for us to learn to inhabit a world, not possible to come to know
how that world most fundamentally is, and not possible to engage our
emotions with the order of things. Hedley also thinks that the Christian
life cannot properly be lived nor Christian truth known without the imagination: what the imagination shows us is a cosmos beautiful in its created
nature, and ourselves as quivering in reverie, responsive to that cosmos
and to its maker. Christians ought therefore to be imaginative defenders
of the imagination, Hedley thinks: both liturgy and theology require it.
Hedley’s book is devoted to explicating and defending many aspects of
this central thesis against its most influential opponents, who include: reductive naturalists in philosophy, for whom the imagination is cognitively

